Federalism, or the fear of it, worked as a catalyst in the British referendum on Brexit in June 2016. In this paper we focus on the pre-European integration context and ask what kind of an alternative federalism was seen to afford in British politics before and after the Second World War. We limit our discussion to parliamentary debates, which have only rarely been used as primary sources for studying European integration history. The British Parliament was one of the key political arenas for debates on foreign policy, not just in terms of informing the party lines but also guiding the public discussion. In the early part of the 1940s the British federalist movement was able to generate political debate on the issue and gain the attention of many leading politicians. We argue that the approach to the use of the concept was politically charged but remained open to various context-based interpretations, which did not eventually lead to any concrete proposals. During the latter part of the 1940s the majority of British MPs were open to different ways of creating unity in Europe. The emphasis on national sovereignty, however, continued. As a result 'federalism', attached to structures for unity, gave way to more pragmatic political solutions.
Introduction
After the Second World War, Britain took a very prominent role in arguing for the unity of Europe as former Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous Zürich speech in 1946. In the context of European co-operation, federalism entailed both economic and political benefits, in addition to the construction of shared identity and institutional structures. However, the Labour government was not keen on engaging in any federal plans. The aim of this paper is to analyse arguments presented in the British Parliament in the 1940s featuring unusual, or even paradoxical, conceptualizations of federalism in the European context. This is carried out in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the situation in which British interests regarding European integration were positioned, and to give a point of reflection to Britain's subsequent relations with Europe. For instance, in the early 1970s fears of federalism influenced debates on the British policy towards the European Economic Community, and in the debates prior to the 2016 referendum the feeling of loss of sovereignty entailed the perceived danger of deepening political union. 1 The period before and after the Second World War marks in many ways a shift in the political order in Europe. Between the wars, Britain had been considered as the leading country of internationalist education, owing largely to the League of Nations Union that had a wide-ranging educational programme on international relations. This influential movement, reaching its peak in popularity in the early 1930s, promoted the idea of British citizens being 'entitled to have their say over the direction of foreign policy '. 2 By the end of the decade, however, the League of Nations had clearly failed to pacify the continent. Across the party political spectrum, federalism was seen as the last remaining option for the future of Europe, which is also shown in the extraordinary proposal of Churchill's coalition government for the creation of Franco-British Union in June 1940 that would hardly have been conceivable twenty years earlier. The British federalists were extremely influential not only in the British context but also in continental Europe. Among other federalist texts, especially Lord Lothian's pamphlet
Pacifism is not enough, nor patriotism either (1935) influenced and inspired Altiero
Spinelli, who found British federalist thought 'precise and antidoctrinaire'. 5 Based on this connection, it seems rather paradoxical that federalism never took hold in British political thought.
Previous research into the history of British federalism has mainly focused on movements and associations advocating federalism. 6 Our emphasis, however, will be on the parliamentary debates, which allows us to analyse the arguments surrounding European federalism in British politics from the perspective of actual political discourse. The verbatim records of parliamentary debates provide previously nonexplored source material for analysis of British political thought of federalism. We argue that the speech acts in the parliamentary debates offer fruitful material for a more profound understanding of the federalist debate in Britain. Parliamentary debates do not just display the arguments for and against on issues of national significance but also guided the wider public debates. They provide an important public platform for government and opposition alike in the controversies and challenges of foreign policy. 7 From this point of view, it is relevant to consider the British federalist discourse as part of the legitimisation of political decision-making.
To study the debates on European federalism in the Westminster parliament, we use a methodological approach that combines contextual analysis of speech acts, drawing on the works of J. L. Austin, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, and more traditional conceptual history, based on German Begriffsgeschichte as propounded by Reinhart Koselleck, extending to the more recent theories in the study of parliamentary debates. 8 In the field of conceptual history, parliamentary debates have become considered as essential sources to examine the dynamics of the use of political language as well as current controversies through discursive processes. 9 This kind of qualitative analysis provides a fruitful way to grasp the historical contingency of the federalism debate in Britain, as it focuses on individual political agents and their intentional use of language. Instead of concentrating on 'uncritically accepted ideologies', analysing speech acts will help to illustrate how current beliefs have become accepted from amongst many other possibilities. Here it serves for a critical reading of what kinds of other alternatives and justifications were presented in British public debate on federalism. 10 The corpus of our analysis is not very large due to the selection criteria.
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But it would be all too easy to dismiss the 1940s' federalism debate as a marginal issue.
Indeed, after the fleeting success of the federal movement at the beginning of the Second World War, the debate on the topic started to become rather sidelined in British politics. Nevertheless, even less popular issues have the potential to become prominent due to the publicity of debating, a point of view that encourages not only the study of mainstream themes but also the analysis of apparent anomalies.
It is not our intention to explain the narrative in detail or to test the frequency of the use of economic and political arguments but to analyse how the concept of federalism was articulated in parliamentary debates in order to provide points of reflection to the current British discussion. Our attention is on what kinds of arguments were attached to the idea of federalism in the parliamentary debates in order to interpret the shifting political aspects of the concept. We asked, first, as what kind of an alternative the idea of a federal Europe was presented; secondly, who were its main proponents in the British Parliament; and finally, what was the turning point for the decline of federalist thought in Britain as observable in the parliamentary debates?
Newspapers and archival sources are used to complement the analysis to reconstruct the understanding of European federalism as a political idea.
Our analysis is divided into two sections, first, to concentrate on the arguments about federalism during the wartime and, then, to shift the attention to the post-war context. This division has been chosen because it seems to have been easier to support federalism during the war, as no one knew about the outcome and how it would affect the European politics. Clement Attlee, the leader of Labour party that had endorsed federalism since at least 1918, had coined his famous phrase in 1939: 'Europe must federate or perish'. 12 After the war, the Labour party, however, quickly gained a reputation for being anti-European. On the Conservative benches a number of key politicians advocated unity, but intergovernmental co-operation was preferred over federalism. 13 To investigate further how these party positions were constructed and defended, we will first turn to the use of the idea of federalism in the parliamentary debates during the war. Samuel's suggestion that federalism was not the only possible alternative for 'international co-operation'. He argued that federalism had 'two distinct branches', federation and confederation, which had to be reconciled 'because one hopes that the principle of democratic control, the direct participation of the peoples themselves, may find a place in the long-term plan of post-war reconstruction. I believe that, after all, a democratic basis is the best guarantee for a just and durable peace '. 22 He proposed that the idea of federalism should not be entirely abandoned but was willing to suppress any supranational elements of the post-war settlement. In his book Davies had promoted a view that considered 'federal institutions' as 'consisting of representatives of member states' that passed resolutions unanimously without a democratic structure.
Westminster debates on European federalism during World War II
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In the House of Lords debate, however, he seems to relate the idea of federalism to 'democratic control' as the condition for 'just and durable peace' in Europe. By way of contrast, in another House of Lords debate the same year the British Empire was defended in strikingly similar terms by Viscount Elibank, with no reference to federalism. He contended that the Empire was based on 'bonds and ideals' of 'freedom of thought, of action, and expression, of self-government, and religious liberty', and that it was through 'these democratic ideals' that the Empire would continue to stay united in the future. have its own armed forces. According to Cecil these three suggestions for improvement were rather vague and there were more important issues that needed to be addressed first. He urged the government to come up with a concrete solution as to the constitution of the international authority. In his view there were only three available 'schools of thought'. The first one did not aim at a definite constitution, on the grounds that this would prove 'the more difficult' to carry out. Cecil himself argued that the international authority envisaged needed a constitution. He said that there was a second school of thought which argued that the League of Nations had not been 'definite enough, and that nothing short of something in the nature of a new Federal State or Federal Union is any use.' Cecil himself, however, was reluctant to suggest a federal model because he considered it 'premature' and was not convinced that it would be a viable basis for an international organisation. The third option, of which he was in favour, was a confederation 'of really independent States, who have agreed for certain purposes to act together in order to preserve peace and promote international co-operation.' 27 Lord Davies, who spoke after Cecil, agreed that some form of international authority had to be founded after the war.
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Rather than dwelling on federation or confederation, his argument involved the United Nations as the main international organisation. His suggestion was opposed by Lord Samuel, who was not in favour of establishing an organisation with a written constitution overriding the British constitutional system. In this context he made a reference to the Federal Union saying that its members were 'actively engaged in the interesting parlour game of drafting constitutions on paper' which would, in all likelihood, amount to nothing. Arthur Creech Jones (Labour; Shipley), who was known for his expertise in colonial affairs and was Ernest Bevin's protégé, also agreed that 'federalism is not the way of advance, that the idea of federalism is not practical politics in any discussion of our relations with the Dominions'. This was one of the few instances during the war that federalism was explicitly promoted in the Westminster parliament. But Hore-Belisha connected the founding of a federation to the preservation of the British Empire. The only one to defend the idea of founding a European federation was the Earl of Huntingdon (Labour). According to him, it was the 'only device which so far has worked' to prevent war: 'By federation you remove the means of making war from each State and put it into the hands of a federal authority '. 37 All in all, both Conservative and Labour MPs in the parliamentary debates that took place during the war expressed their doubts about the federal system. However, some remained fairly open to the idea of federalism as one option for securing longterm peaceful co-existence among European nations. Among them was Commander King-Hall (Labour; Ormskirk) who urged the government to devise a policy for 'a united or federated form of Europe'.
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Even though the idea of federalism was generally deemed outmoded or impracticable, the majority of MPs argued for it as a plan that was desperately needed to make sure that peace would be lasting. However, the concept of federalism was rather associated with the idea of empire than the founding of a supranational organisation. The fact is, no one ever surrenders sovereignty; they merge it into a greater sovereignty'. This led former Conservative foreign secretary Anthony Eden to declare that a new conceptual understanding of sovereignty was needed. Such discussion was relevant, as the readiness to embrace changes to sovereignty was the ingredient needed for federalism. Furthermore, the 'world assembly' Bevin envisaged was about maintaining peace, and thus closely related to the work carried out to establish the United Nations. 42 The point was that Britain had survived the war without suffering as much political and institutional damage as most of the European states. It was in a better position to lead the creation of a federal organisation. Bevin did not promote just any organisation, but one with socialist ideology, albeit in less radical form than that of the Communists. Now, after yet another world war, the same plan was referred to. 45 To build structures for unity was time consuming, and this was generally understood. 46 In the British parliamentary system, the majority party had significant powers over the federalisation policy, or the lack thereof. Furthermore, if there were to be a federal structure, it had to uphold certain amounts of liberal tradition, in addition to more social democratic principles, in order to gather support from the opposition benches. The tradition was referred to in the debates, likewise the need to signal the British readiness to consider different kinds of initiatives.
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Despite publicly positive stances, actual efforts to lead the integration effort were lacking in 1945, and the following year brought no better results, at least as far as the British were concerned. Initiatives from other countries were also absent. It appeared that it was not easy to have a full parliamentary debate on federation, at least in the Commons, although at least one effort was made.
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Among the general public, attitudes towards supranational political authority differed, although the issue was seldom even referred to. It seemed to imply a phase of creating structures, and at this point even the general agreement to proceed with integration was lacking in intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, it was not even clear that a Western European federation was the solution and there were other ideas as well.
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What was needed was more energy to carry out the plans.
According to Lipgens, it was Winston Churchill's Zurich speech on 19
September 1946 that brought European unity back onto the political agenda. The general public had appeared to have lost interest in the issue after the end of the war but a speech from a prominent, if not the most salient, politician of one of the main victors of the war led many other key politicians to start considering the issue again. Supranational authority was envisaged, but the concept of national sovereignty continued to emphasize the fears and problems of federalism. Many MPs mentioned the loss of sovereignty, despite the fact that at this point there were no concrete proposals to create structures. Another issue was the schedule; should states advance step by step in creating unity, with federalism a distant potential goal, or should they advance rapidly, as supporters of worldwide federalism as Henry Usborne (Labour; Acocks Green) stated, due to the pressing contextual reasons and practically as the only way to achieve peace.
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The fear of the Communists also influenced the federalist MPs. For instance, in late September Robert Boothby (Conservative; Aberdeen and Kincardine East) warned against the rapid Communist advance in Europe: 'there is no time to set up any kind of elaborate federal constitution'.
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From the government benches it was hoped that more attention might be paid to the meaning and substance of European unity rather than to constitutions.
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The constitutional approach to federalism was more clearly present after the Congress of Europe, as it had drawn attention to the aspect, but this also clashed with governmental interests in Britain. In May 1948 Attlee had told the House that unity should advance step by step as practical issues arose. A similar approach was present in the diplomatic negotiations that continued to stress the clear international movement to create permanent structures and look for a kind of European Parliament. After the war, there was a major conceptual shift in the orientation of the federalism debate. The parliamentary debates show that the concept of federalism was used as the complete opposite for the management of the empire, and in this way the concept played a role in the redefinition of national sovereignty. As the newly appointed Labour government's members had been previously promoting federalism, it first seemed that this created a much-needed opportunity to make concrete federal plans. The paradox was that, although federalism was referred to in rather positive terms in the House of Commons, the Labour government was lacking the initiative to make concrete proposals in relation to the European integration process. Before his appointment as the At the same time when the concept of federalism became a part of the wider European discussion, the Labour government was constrained by its own policies and the indirect rise of national sovereignty. In fact, after 1946, many British MPs were definitely willing to support federalism, but simultaneously somewhat critical, underlying only the actions necessary to avoid the further Communist success in an economically devastated Europe. This kind of approach concentrated on practical issues instead of pursuing strong structures that might undermine the British position towards the Empire. The loss of national sovereignty was still a major concern among the MPs, as well as the rapidly changing political situation in continental Europe that made the planning of the federal structures very difficult. And most significantly, neither of the two leading political parties in the British Parliament was willing to give up the 24 
